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Abstract
China's privatization program was initiated in April 1984 through the State
Commission: however, the State continues to hold dominant shares in privatized
companies. The fast growing economy has created a favorable environment for the
private economy to develop, especially in property markets that have heen booming
since 2000. This study u.fes data of all the listed property companies in China's .stock
markets from 2000 to 2005 to investigate two issues: (J) who owns China's listed
property companies: and (2) the performance differences between these two types of
property companies. The goals of the research are to examine whether state-owned
companies are less efficient and underperfonn privately-owned companies in the
property sector and what type of property companies are good investments.
The further reform of housing privatization in China triggered rapid expansion of the
property market in the second half of 2000 and the expansion, fueled by continuous
economic growth and massive urbanization, has continued ever since. From 2000 to
2005. investment in fixed assets increased 20% p.a. and real estate investment
increased 25% p.a., representing 17% of total fixed asset investment (Exhibit 1).
Residential property investment accounted for 68%' of total real estate investment,
office buildings, 4.7%, and retail, industrial, and others, 27.3%. The real estate sector
in China is viewed as the housing economy, with residential investment and
development being in a predominant position.
However, foreign direct investment (excluding Hong Kong) in China's real estate
market takes on a less important position, representing less than 5% of total real estate
investment, largely due to the volatility of governmental policy regarding foreign
direct investment in real estate, the complexity of practical operation, and the daunting
regulatory regime. In 2005. foreign direct investment in China's real estate market
was USD 5.4 billion, less than 3% of total real estate investment. This figure surged
to USD 8.2 billion in 2006, with foreign investors purchasing completed development
projects in major and the second-tier cities (JLL. 2007a). For example, as testimony
to the growing international confidence in Chinese property during 2006, Pramerica
purchased a 50% interest in the Walk Shopping Centre in Shenzhen for USD 118
million, and Standard Chartered made its first investment in the Chinese real estate
market by placing USD 50 million in the Shanghai-based Shimao Property Holdings
(JLL, 2007b).
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Exhibit 1
Investment Profile in China (2000-2005)
Value in USD Billions
Fixed asset investment
Growth rate |%)
Real estate investment
Growth rate (%)
2000
397.6
11%
59.2
20%
% of total fixed asset investment 15%
Foreign direct investment
Growth rate (%}
% of real estate investment
4.66
7.9%
Notes: The source is wvtfw.stats.gov.cn.
2001
445.6
12%
75.4
27%
17%
5.14
10%
6.8%
2002
525.4
18%
93.5
24%
18%
5.66
10%
6.1%
2003
665.7
27%
122.1
31%
18%
5.24
- 7 %
4.3%
2004
846.3
27%
158.9
30%
19%
5.95
14%
3.7%
2005
1,070.1
26%
190.3
20%
18%
5.42
- 9 %
2.8%
Average
20%
25%
17%
4%
5%
Nevertheless, foreign direct investment currently plays an insignificant role in China's
booming real estate market. The Chinese government exerts policy restrictions on
foreign property investment. According to a report by Jones Lang LaSalle (2007a),
the restrictions include such items as that for total investment of more than USD 10
million, the registered capital of a real estate foreign investment enterprise should not
be lower than 50% of the total investment (previously 40%), and if the registered
capital of a foreign investment enterprise is less than 35% of the total investment,
loans are not allowed to be taken out, etc.
Investing in listed property companies to reap the benefit of the booming Chinese
property market is one ofthe routes for foreign investors to enter the Chinese property
market. However, one of the barriers in investing in China's stock markets is the share
structure segmentation. Contrary to the former Soviet Union and other Eastern
European countries who took a "Big Bang" approach (Lipton and Sachs, 1990),
privatizing all firms at once, the Chinese government has taken a gradual approach,
advocating economic stabilization, liberalization, and privatization as the necessary
components of economic reform. The government privatized its state-owned
enterprises (SOE) by retaining a control right in many of the newly privatized
companies, especially the ones in key industries. Accordingly, the share structure is
split into tradable and non-tradable shares. Tradable shares (A-shares and B-shares)'
are the conventional shares that can be freely traded in the stock markets, while non-
tradable shares are further classified as state shares and legal person shares. State
shares are owned directly by the government department, its agent, or the listed
company itself on behalf of the state. Legal person shares are owned by an institution
that has a legal person status, be it a SOE or a privately-owned enterprise (POE). The
transfer of state shares and legal person shares is restricted and needs the approval of
China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC); normally, the transfer price is
negotiated under the counter between two parties.
There has been a wide debate on the drawbacks of this split share structure in China's
stock market. The key issues include the protection of investor's interests and rights.
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along with the corporate governance related to the ownership structure. State shares
have been argued to have an inverse impact on firm pertbrmance (Wang and Xu,
1997; Chen. Lee, and Rui, 2001; Wei and Verela, 2003; and Bai. Liu, Lu, Frank, and
Zhang, 2004). The split share structure has been believed to restrain the further growth
of China's stock market and should be reformed. As a result, the Chinese government
implemented the split share structure reform in September 2005 to let all the shares
float in the stock markets step-by-step. The aim.s of the reform are to protect investor
interests, enhance corporate governance, and encourage institutional investment in the
Chinese stock markets. The reform opened up opportunities for foreign investors to
invest in China's stock market.
Exhibit 2 demonstrates the share structure profile of China's stock markets in 2005.
The majority of China's listed companies have a mixed ownership structure, with the
state retaining a controlling number of shares. In 2005, nearly 60% of shares
(including lock-up sales shares') are non-tradable state shares and legal person
shares; among those, 10.58% are lock-up sales shares, which are not allowed to be
sold publicly within 12 months from the time the company announced the split share
reform implementation plan. State shares account for 28% of total shares and legal
person shares are 21%. The number of tradable shares will increase after the unlocking
of these state shares in the following years; meanwhile, the proportion of state shares
will decline. The state may retreat from the controlling position in some of the
companies, but are likely to retain control over some of the large companies.
The property sector is more liquid than the whole stock market (Exhibit 3). For
example, in 2005, 48% of property equity was tradable shares, 31% were owned
directly by the state or its agent in the form of state shares and state legal person
shares, and 21% were owned by private institutions (including those from Hong Kong)
in the form of legal person shares. The number of shares owned by the state and/or
its agent tended to decline over the study period. In 2000, the state owned 41% of
property shares, which declined to 31% in 2005. It is expected to decline further when
all the shares, especially the state shares (including state-owned legal person shares),
can be freely traded. The number of tradable shares rose from 39% in 2000 to 48%
in 2005. while the legal person shares remained stable at 21%, on average.
One of the characteristics of China's property sector is that there is a strong presence
of POEs. In the past few decades, these POEs have been actively participating in
Exhibit 2
Share Structure of China's Stock Markets in 2005
Non-tradable
State Shares
27.9%
Shares
Legal Person Shares
21.33%
Note: The source is www.cninfo.com.
Tradable
A-Shares
29.91%
Shares
B Shares and Others
9.58%
Lock-up Sales Shares
10.58%
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Exhibit 3
Share Structure of China's Property Companies
60°/=
48%
45%
ED Tradabis shares
• State equity
D Legal person shares
21%
4 1 % 41%
20%
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
property development, and have been expanding fast and contributing greatly lo
China's economy and property market. In 2000, they started to seek financing in stock
markets through IPOs or acquiring underperforming listed SOEs. They have formed
an important component in China's property sector.
The listed property companies, particularly the SOEs, have a mixed ownership
structure with tradable shares and non-tradable shares (state shares or/and state legal
person shares), with the state owning the controlling number of shares in SOEs. The
temporary mixed ownership is argued to be necessary (Perotti, 1994, 2003). since
under uncertain public commitment, the government can credibly inspire confidence
by transferring control immediately while selling ownership gradually, signaling its
commitment to privatization by its willingness to bear residual risk. It is also argued
that the public sector should keep control over the decision-making rights until
property regulation is in place, since partial, temporary state ownership may be needed
until the needed institutional and regulatory frameworks are established (Nellis, 2003).
There are quite a few researchers studying the various aspects of share issues and
stock markets in China (e.g.. Ma, 1995; Chui and Kwok, 1998: Sjoo and Zhang, 2000;
and Chen, Lee, and Rui, 2001). Empirical studies addressing this type of ownership
structure in China by differentiating state shares from legal person shares, suggest
that a higher ratio of state shares leads to lower firm value (Xu and Wang, 1997; Wei
and Verela, 2003; and Bai. Liu, Lu, Frank, and Zhang, 2004).
There is a wealth of literature addressing the inefficiency in SOEs^ (e.g.. World Bank,
1995; and Megginson and Netter, 2001). In sum, empirical findings exhibit a
significantly lower productive efficiency in comparison with POEs, leading to a lack
of managerial and employee incentives to efficiency, problems of competence or
corruption by state authorities, and the use of SOBs for political purposes, instead of
favored constituencies.
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The purpose of this paper is first to find out who owns China's listed property
companies—state agent or private institution; then, it examines whether the type of
ultimate owner is relevant to firm performance by comparing the differences between
the two types of companies in terms of size, profit, sustained growth, productivity,
managerial incentive, operational efficiency, attracting and retaining talented
individuals, and ownership concentration. There is limited research addressing the
performance of China's listed property companies. Newell, Chau, Wong, and
McKinnell (2005) study the direct and indirect real estate markets in China by
analyzing the market performance of China's listed property companies. Ke and Isaac
(2007) study the relationship between ownership concentration and business
performance of Chinese listed property companies, but the productivity and efficiency
and market performance issues are not considered. This paper extends the previous
study by focusing on investigating the efficiency issue of Chinese listed property
company in terms of ultimate owner (SOE or POE) and its impact on performance,
with the aim to extend the existing knowledge of indirect investment in China's
property market. In particular, this research appears to be significantly important while
China is reforming the split share structure of listed companies and "foreign investors
will be allowed to do some strategic mergers and acquisitions once the share reform
is completed," (Shang Fulin, head of the CSRC, quoted from The Financial Times,
September, 15, 2006).
The paper starts with the discussion on China's property companies, followed by a
discussion of the sample, research methodology, and the empirical results. The paper
closes with concluding remarks.
China's Property Companies
With the emergence and formation of China's property market in the early 1980s,
China's property companies came into being as an independent entity. They were
facility management divisions in SOEs, responsible for renovating and maintaining
the company's buildings, including the residential buildings for the employees.
With the economic reform, production was expanded, income was increased, and
people's living standard was enhanced. There was a huge demand for property. These
operational departments were actively involved in property development and
expanding their businesses. They took advantage of entrepreneurial real estate
opportunities. In some companies, the facilities function operated as a business unit,
seeking profits through real estate involvement, competing directly in the real estate
market seeking development opportunities beyond the business of the parent
companies—either as an independent entity or a subsidiary. The first batch of property
development companies appeared in Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, the major
costal cities in southeast China, to undertake the building and developing of Special
Economic Development Zones in these cities, as promoted and supported by the
central government policy.
Unlike the Hong Kong property market where the property market is highly
concentrated by the largest 9 property companies, which represent 12% of the total
188 Journal of Real Estate Literalure
market capitalization and 82% of the property company sector (Newell Chau, and
Wong, 2004), China's property companies can be characterized as being large in
quantity, but small in economic scale. In 2005, there were 59,242 property companies
registered with the government's Industrial and Commercial Administration
Department (Exhibit 4). The number of POEs and SOEs is more or less the same.
The average asset held per company is only USD 0.02 billion and the revenue is USD
0.003 billion, obviously due to a lack of economic scale and competence.
In 2005, there were 51 property companies listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange and
Shanghai Stock Exchange, representing 0.1% of the total property companies.
Generally speaking, the listed property companies are larger in size as measured by
sales and total assets; they are more profitable, have lower gearing ratio, and
outperform the property sector as a whole. Amongst them, 19 are owned by private
institutions (domestic and Hong Kong); 32 are owned by the state. Obviously, the
listed property sector in China is controlled by the state.
Actually, the property companies were among the ones listed earliest in China's stock
markets at the beginning of 1990s. The property sector was once an influential one
and property share was the barometer of entire stock markets. Now, the property sector
is a small sector, being the eighth largest sector (Newell, Chau, Wong, and McKinnell,
2005) in China's stock markets. In 2005, there were 1,380 companies listed on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, with market
capitalization (A-shares) of USD 128.4 billion; only 51 (3.1%) companies are in the
property sector, with market capitalization (A-shares) of USD 6.6 billion, representing
5.2% of total market capitalization (Exhibit 5).
The first reason for the presence of such a small number of listed property companies
in China's stock markets could be due to the government's tightening control over
the new listing of a property company. The new listing of a property company via an
IPO was .suspended from 1995 to 2002 to cool down the overheating real estate
market. The ban was lifted with the property market expansion in 2002. From 2002
to 2005, there were four new listings in the properly sector. Another reason for the
iow number of listed property companies is that the threshold to the entrance of the
stock markets is relatively high. The company that is seeking listing in China's stock
markets must have three consecutive years of profits before they are eligible to apply
for an IPO. In addition, the whole application process is complicated, time and
resource consuming, and full of uncertainties; therefore, some property companies go
abroad to seek going public, such as in the Hong Kong stock market.
Geographically, China's property companies can be categorized into two groups. The
first group is the Special Economic Development Zone (SEDZ) group. These are the
property companies whose major business activities are undertaken, largely, though
not to be restricted, in Special Economic Development Zones, including utilities and
infrastructure constructing, property (industrial buildings and office buildings)
developing and managing, land use right transfer, and administrating the businesses
settled in the SEDZ on behalf of the local government. Nine companies can be
categorized into this group. The property companies in this group are SOEs, the
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Exhibit 5
Market Capitaiization (A-Shares)
No. of listed companies
Total mrt. cap (USD billions)
No. of listed property companies
% of total listed companies
Property mrt. cap (USD billions)
% of total Mrt. Cap
2000
1,086
194.
34
3.
8.
4.
3
1%
1
2%
2001
1,160
174.7
49
4.2%
8.0
4.6%
2002
1,224
150.8
49
4.0%
8.6
5.7%
2003
1,287
159.2
53
4.1%
6.9
4.3%
2004
1.377
141.2
53
3.8%
7.0
5.0%
2005
1,380
128.4
51
3.7%
6.6
5.2%
offshoots of local government performing the tasks of developing and managing the
SEDZs. The second group is the property development and management companies,
for whom developing and then trading a property is the core business. A few of them
develop the property and hold it as investment to derive income; 42 companies can
be categorized into this group. For the diversification of business activities, the line
between two types of companies has become blurred.
Exhibit 6 shows the top five listed property companies ranked by sales; the top five
are Vanke, China Merchants Shekou Holdings, Xinjiang Guanghui, Shen Changchen,
and China Enterprise. Aggregately, these companies account for 36% of the sales,
43% of profit, and 23% of market capitalization in the listed property sector. Four of
them are SOHs, and one, Xinjian Guanghui, is a POE. Vanke, the largest, is the only
property company ranked amongst top 100 listed companies in China's stock markets.
Obviously, the large property companies are controlled and owned by the state.
Exhibit 6
Top 5 Listed Property Companies Ranked by Safes (2002-2005}
Company
Vanke
China Merchants Shekou
Xinjiang Guanghui
Shen Changchen
China Enterprise
Total
% of total listed property
Holdings
companies
Sales
3,524.2
1,325.4
1,138.7
1,031.6
1,015.4
8,035.3
36%
Profit
554
176.7
145.6
40.8
212.5
1,129.6
43%
Mrt. Cap."
4,015.9
958.9
810
250.4
783.7
6,818.9
23%
Development
3,440.1
726.4
808.9
455
578.5
6,007.8
Rental
—
68.8
0.9
93.2
21.5
184.2
FM and
Others"
84.2
85.5
—
157.5
136.5
463.4
Notes: All values are in USD millions.
"A-shares.
''Others include hotel management, utilities supplies, land rental, and construction engineering.
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Property development constitutes a substantial component of these property
companies' activities, with rental and facilities management and others, such as hotel
management, utilities supplying, and construction engineering, represented to a lesser
extent. Residential property development orientation is the major characteristic of
these property companies and is most evident in Vanke and Xinjiang Guanghui.
Data Defínition
Hypothesis
The classic argument against state control suggests that the SOE structure is
inefficient, seeks excessive employment and wages, and attracts selfish politicians,
which leads to corruption and patronage and transfers the resources to its supporters
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The hypotheses are set up on these arguments.
Hypothesis (1): SOE is underperforming and inefficient:
Performance = /3„ + ßySales + ß^Gearing + ß^ßrowth -\- ß^Pay
+ ß^V'Holder + ß^T^'^Holder
^ + ß^SOE + e. (1)
The performance variables are tbe natural logarithm return on equity (ROE) and share
price return (SR). It should be expected that SOE has a negative coefficient in Equation
(1).
Hypothesis (2): SOE is less productive:
Productivity (Log) = ß„ + ß^AssetlLabor (Log) + ß^HE + ßßOE + e. (2)
A highly educated employee {HE) would facilitate the enhanced productivity and firm
performance, so it is expected this ratio has a positive impact on productivity. SOE
is argued to be less productive; therefore, it is expected that SOE should be inversely
related to productivity.
Data Definition
The sample selection rule used here is that each company has at least two consecutive
years of financial statement data between 2000 and 2(X)5. The two-year requirement
represents an attempt to balance two sampling issues: collecting several observations
for each company so that the econometric panel data technique can be used and
limiting survivorship bias by allowing companies to enter and exit the panel over
time. Two companies dropped out of the 2005 data set. They diverted their core
business from the property sector due to the change of the controlling shareholders
and the business strategy as well. There are 289 cases in the sample.
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Accounting data are obtained from the annual reports of listed property companies.
Performance measures used by previous researchers to compare state ownership versus
private ownership are mostly accounting-based, such as return on sales (ROS), return
on total assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). However, the most widely used
measure in the equity and performance literature is Tobin's Q.* One difficulty with
Tobin's Q is that a large proportion of shares of the listed firms in China cannot be
traded freely and therefore do not have market prices. No consensus exists about how
to compute the total market value of firms with a substantial percentage of non-
tradable shares (Bai. Liu, Lu, Frank, and Zhang. 2004). The annual stock return^ is
another measure used to examine market performance. We use this ratio (SR) as a
market performance indicator, in an attempt to mitigate, though not able to eliminate,
the impact of non-tradable shares. The accounting performance measurement indicator
used here is the natural logarithm return on equity, denoted as ROE (Ln). Productivity
and operating efficiency measures like sales per employee or net income per employee
are used in previous similar research. We use the sales per employee denoted as
productivity to measure the productivity and the ratio of selling, general and
administration costs to sales denoted as SG&A to sale to measure the operating
efficiency. SOE is argued to be inefficient; therefore, this ratio is expected to be
positively correlated with SOE. If employment is one of the government's objectives,
SOEs should employ more workers and have lower productivity. Since most of these
property companies are developers, these ratios are applicable and comparable.
The other study variables are defined as follows:
Sales = The nominal operating income and the proxy of company
size.
Gearing = The debt-to-asset ratio. It equals the book value of the total
debt divided by the book value of total assets.
Profit = Calculated as the net profit.
SOE = A state-owned enterprise that is used as an indicator
variable. It equals one if the company is a state-owned
company.
7" Holder-W"' Holder = Ownership structure is measured by the percentage of
shares owned by the largest shareholders in the company.
It is argued that ownership concentration is relevant to firm
performance (Shleifer, 1998; and Megginson and Netter,
2001).
Growth = Growth sustainability is measured by three-year average
business growth rate to reflect the long-term growth
sustainability.
Pay = Manager incentive is measured by salary per senior
manager. Managerial share ownership as an incentive
scheme is rarely in place in China's listed companies;
therefore, the senior manager's salary is used to proxy
incentive scheme. The pay to manager is comprised of two
parts: basic salary and performance bonus.
VOLUME 16, NUMBER 2. 2(X)S
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Labor = Labor is the number of staff employed by tbe company. A
SOE is expected to employ more staff.
Asset/Labor = Asset utilization is measured by asset per labor. This ratio
is used as proxy of efficiency and is expected to be
positively related to productivity.
HE = The potential for a company to attract and retain highly
educated employees is proxied by tbe percentage of
employees who have a higher educational background.
Descriptive Statistics Results
The descriptive statistics are pre.sented in Exhibit 7. SOE is significantly larger in
terms of size measured by sales. The first largest shareholder is in a controlling
po.sition, holding 39% of total shares, while tbe first largest sharebolding in a SOE is
42.9%, significantly higher than the one in a POE (31.6%). The other largest
shareholders (2'"'-IO"') in POEs hold a significantly larger portion of shares (11.7%
and 12.1%) than those in SOEs (5.7% and 7.4%). By the end of 2005. eight SOEs
had announced a split share structure reform implementation plan to fioat their state
or state legal person shares by 2009, representing 14.8% of total property sbares.
Therefore, the ratio of the first largest shareholding in SOEs is expected to decline
while the number of tradable shares increases.
SOEs employ more people, pay senior manager higher, and attract more highly
educated workers. Though a SOE is argued to underperform a POE and have lower
productivity; however, in the property sector, SOEs have higher productivity than
POEs. but the difference is insignificant. Inefficiency also exists in POE.s. SOEs are
more profitable in general, but POEs are growing faster. The operational efficiency
variable measured by the ratio of selling, general, and administration cost to sales
does not seem to suggest that a SOE is less efficient than a POE.
Who are the ultimate owners of the listed property companies? By tracing the ultimate
owner along the ownership chain, we have found the governmenl agent in the form
of a holding company or an investment company, the parent company, and another
SOE, as the representative of the state, owns the state-owned listed property
companies. The listed company itself, domestic companies, and Hong Kong
institutions are the owners of POEs. Eor example, Shenzhen Construction Investment
Controlling Company as representative of Shenzhen municipal government controls
4 listed property companies (Shen Wuye, 28.02%; Shen Zhenye, 59.75%; Shen
Shenfang, 73.52%; and Shen Great Wall, 34.5%) by holding 1.2 billion state shares,
accounting for 3% of total property shares in the Shenzhen stock market and the
Shanghai stock market and 10% of property shares in Shenzhen stock market (Exhibit
8). Given the restructuring of the controlling shareholder in 2006, three of the
companies were transferred to the Shenzhen Municipal State Assets Management and
Supervision Commission, a government agent. One company (Shen Wuye) was sold
to a Hong Kong investment company. Two companies announced the share reform
implementation plan to float all of their state shares by the end of 2009.
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Exhibit 8
The Holding Company
Shenzhen Construction Investment Controlling
Company (SOE)
i J.
Shen Zhenye
28.02% of shares
Shen Wuye
59.75% of shares
Shens Shenfan
73.52% of" shares
Shen Changcheng
34.5% of shares
An ownership concentration structure is widely adopted by countries with poor
shareholder protection. While the largest shareholder can sometimes be the state, more
often it is a family, usually the founder of the firm or his descendants (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). This is the case for the Chinese listed property
sector. However, Hart (1995) argues that there are two disadvantages to holding a
large portion of shares in a company. The first is that owning a large number of shares
will offset the gains from going public; the risk reduction benefits from portfolio
diversification are lost. The second is that, even though large shareholdings can
mitigate the agency problems, they cannot eliminate them.
Results and Discussion
The regression results are reported in Exhibit 9. The first hypothesis is rejected. The
positive coefficient of SOE in the first equation indicates that SOEs perfonn
significantly well in China's property market. Obviously, the classic argument against
SOEs is not entirely applicable to China's property sector. China's property market is
a highly competitive, but not a fully transparent market with the typical features of
an emerging market. Politics still plays an important role in the property market and
influences firm performance. The SOEs undertake the task of urban regeneration and
housing development on behalf of the government and enjoy preferential treatment,
which may not be available to POEs. As pointed out by one referee, SOEs can usually
obtain land at lower prices (than tender or auction) by negotiating with the
government, especially when the government is the controlling shareholder of the
property companies. SOEs also have easier access to financial instrutnents provided
by the state-owned banks in China. The interest rates charged by these banks were
set by the state at a very low level during the period of observation and the lower
rates are less accessible to POEs. SOEs are larger in size. Economic scale is important
for a property company; it represents capability and competence in obtaining projects,
especially large and complex projects, along with financing. Additionally, SOEs offer
their employees higher job security and better salaries, therefore, attracting more
highly educated people. All of these can explain the outperformance achieved by
SOEs.
Eirm performance is significantly related to the ownership concentration measured by
the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholders, which indicates that
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Panel A:
FP
F
P-value
Panel B:
F
P-value
Panel C:
F
P-value
Dependent Variable =•• RC
Sales
Gearing
Ratio
0.23 0.09
(2.63)*** (1.18)
0.30
8.68
0.00
Dependent Variable = SR
Sales
-0.15
(-1.70)*
Gearing
Ratio
-0.13
(-1.71)*
0.12
4.48
0
Exhibit 9
Regression Results
)E(Ln)
Growth
0,33
(4.84)**«
Growth
0.12
(1.71)*
1st
Holder
0.23
(2.55)***
1st
Holder
-0.03
(-0.37)
Dependent Variable: Productivity (Log)
SOE
-0.01
(-0.23)
Asset/labor
(Log)
0.52
(6.71)***
0.38
35.62
0.00
HE (%)
0.15
(1.89)*
2nd Others
Holder (3'^-10"^)
0.14 0.16
• (1.65)* (1.68)*
2nd Others
Holder (3"'-10"')
0.15 -0.07
(1.73)* (-0.76)
SOE
0.22
(2.85)***
SOE
0.09
(1.17)
MAG PAY
(SlOk)
0.15
(1.64)*
MAG PAY
($10k)
0.36
(3.98)***
Notes:
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
^•'Significant at the 1% level.
ownership is relevant and that ownership concentration impacts performance, be it in
an SOE or in a POE. Large shareholders provide at least a partial solution to the free-
rider problem of small investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; and Shleifer, 1998) and
in the countries with poor investor protection, control should be concentrated to
prevent someone seizing it without fully paying for it (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer. 1999; and Bebchuk, 1999). The coefficient of the other largest
shareholders (2'"'-10'^) indicates that the increase in other large shareholding is
beneficial to firm performance, since these large shareholders have the incentive to
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monitor company management. These findings are consistent with other empirical
studies (e.g., Wang and Xu, 1997; and Bai, Liu, Lu, Frank, and Zhang, 2004).
Firm performance is significantly related to sales, growth rate, and senior manager's
salary. When the market performance measure (SR) replaces ROE, the accounting
ratio in the second regression in Exhibit 9, among the eight control variables, the
sales and gearing ratio are negatively correlated with stock return (SR). It seems that
smaller firms have better market performance, indicating the speculative feature of
the Chinese stock market, that is, the smaller firm's share prices are more likely to
be manipulated by market speculators, especially given the fact that there are a smaller
portion of tradable shares floating in the stock markets. Actually, the property shares
experienced dramatic fall over the study period, regardless of the property market
expansion. The negative relation of gearing to market performance indicates that the
higher risk related to borrowing will inversely affect market performance. Growth rate
and manager's salary have significantly positive effects on market performance. SOE
has positive, but insignificant correlation with market performance, indicating the
confidence of the investors on the SOEs to a certain extent. Among the ownership
concentration variables, the 2"'' largest shareholding has a significantly positive
effect on performance, consistent with the one in the first equation, but the 1" and
other (3"'-lO"') largest shareholdings have no explanatory power to the market
performance.
Regarding productivity, classic theory suggests that SOEs are inefficient, since SOEs
are more likely to pursue excess employment for political reasons (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1994). In Regression 3, SOE is negatively related to productivity, but
insignificant, indicating the existence of inefficiency in SOEs. The highly educated
employee is significantly connected to enhanced productivity, as expected.
The inefficiency and low productivity in SOEs are argued to be the result of ownership
structure; that is the absence of an ultimate owner (Hu, 2(X)0). The government agents
are the representative of the state assets but not the residual claimants. They have no
incentive to monitor the management of enterprise. So the managers of the company
seek to maximize their own interest, such as perking, rent-seeking, or on-the-job
consumption, at the expense of the company (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).
Conclusion
The empirical study here suggests that SOEs perform well in the Chinese property
market. Inconsistent with the theory, no evidence is found that a state-owned property
company is less efficient than a privately-owned property company. SOEs are larger
in size, more profitable, attract more highly educated people, and pay senior managers
higher salaries. Political factors affect the performance of SOEs. SOEs enjoy the
government preferential treatment in terms of obtaining land at no or lower cost,
access to cheaper financing, and taxation. SOEs also employ more people, maybe for
political purposes, which impacts productivity.
Though China's property market is dominated by SOEs, it is not monopolized by
them, as evidenced by the large number of POEs in the property industry. These POEs
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have been growing faster, actively participating in property development activities,
and contributing greatly to China's property market. Compared with SOEs, POEs are
still in a less competitive position. Given the short history of a private economy in
China, it takes time for POEs to grow stronger and build up competence in the market.
The aims of the split share structure reform in the Chinese stock markets are to
enhance the corporate governance mechanism and protect investor interest. When the
reform is completed, foreign investors can undertake takeover, acquisition, or mergers
with Chinese listed companies. This opens up opportunities for investors to invest
in the Chinese real estate market. This research has a great implication for the
international investors who wish to invest in the indirect real estate market in China.
Endnotes
1. A-shares are held by Chinese domestic individuals; B-shares were available exclusively to
foreign investors until 2000.
2. In accordance with the Circular on Promulgating the Administrative Measures on the Split
Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies, issued by CSRC in September, 2005: (1) the
non-tradable shares shall not be traded or transferred within 12 months from the date of
implementation of the reform plan: (2) a former non-tradabie shareholder who holds more
than 5% of the total shares of a listed company, upon expiry of the lock-up period as stated
in Article 27.1 of the Measures, may sell their shares, with a maximum of 5% of the total
shares ofthe listed company within 12 months via the trading system ofthe stock exchanges,
and not more than 10% within 24 months
3. SOE refers here to the one that the state is the largest shareholder ofthe company (may not
necessarily own over 50%). This definition of state ownership has been used in previous
China studies (e.g.. Wei atid Várela. 2003; and Bai. Liu, Lu, Frank, and Zhang. 2004).
4. Tobin's Q ratio: market value of liabilities is divided by the minimum cost of replacing the
assets that represent these liabilities.
Price,
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